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I. INTRODUCTION
Although hotly debated today, one of the prevailing theories in
the mind of the public as to why the shareholders of a corporation
possess the right to vote in corporate elections is the fact that
shareholders "own" the corporation.' Even though one academic has
written that this theory is the "worst" argument for shareholder
primacy, the notion that shareholders should vote in corporations
because the corporation "belongs" to them is strongly entrenched in the
minds of the general public; in fact, this theory of shareholder primacy
often creeps into judicial opinions, showing that even judges are
influenced by the theory. 2 Although more sophisticated theories have
attracted attention in recent years, the shareholder empowerment
movement today can be viewed as rooted in the innate idea that
shareholders deserve the right to effective control as the true owners of
the corporation. 3
1. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1189, 1190-91 (2002) ("A classic example can be found in Milton Friedman's famed 1970
essay in the New York Times, in which he argued that, because the shareholders of the corporation
are 'the owners of the business,' the only 'social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.'
") (quoting Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26).
2. See id. at 1190 ("Although shareholder 'ownership' language appears most often as a
rhetorical device in the popular press, the assertion that shareholders own the firm also crops up
even in contemporary corporate cases and commentary.").
3. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, J. L. EcON. & ORG. 267 (1988) (reasoning
that the corporate vote should be given to whichever party would minimize the costs-i.e., the
shareholders); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (theorizing that
shareholders get the right to vote to solve the agency problem present in modern corporate
structure); see also J.W. Verret, Pandora's Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting,
Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW 1007 (2007)
(summarizing the shareholder empowerment movement).
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One of the results of the shareholder empowerment movement
has been the adoption by various states of majority voting laws that
prohibit a corporation from changing to a plurality voting scheme4
without shareholder approval after shareholders have voted to enact a
majority voting5 scheme.6 Majority voting provisions ensure that the
directors who are elected to the board have the approval of a majority
of the shareholders rather than just approval of a plurality, which is
easy to obtain when there are no other legitimate candidates.7
Therefore, requiring a majority vote for directors may improve the
ability of shareholders to remove ineffective, underperforming, or
lackluster directors.8 In proxy seasons of the mid-2000s, majority voting
for directors was one of the most important corporate governance
initiatives sought by shareholders.9 The push for majority voting by
shareholders, spearheaded by activist investors seeking corporate
governance improvements, successfully put pressure on boards to adopt
such measures. 10
4. A plurality voting scheme is a voting scheme in which the directors who receive the
greatest number of votes are elected, regardless of whether or not those directors receive a majority
of the votes cast. See David C. McBride & Rolin P. Bissell, Delaware's Flexible Approach to Majority
Voting for Directors, 10 WALL STREET LAWYER 6, (2006), at 1,
http://www.youngconaway.com/files/Publication/327c8402-237c-495e-b3d8-25fd7f017d7fl
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bb838b69-f845-4192-97f2-2f82c41e93d/
WallStreetLawyer.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ZLE-66CB].
5. A "majority voting scheme" requires that a director must receive a majority of the votes
cast in order to be elected. Thus, if a director receives 40% of the votes cast and no other director
receives that many votes, that director would not be elected because a majority voting scheme
requires an elected director to receive greater than 50% of the vote. See id. at 1.
6. See Verret, supra note 3, at 1034-35 (explaining the history of Delaware's majority voting
law). An example of a majority voting provision can be found in Delaware's corporate code: "A
bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for
the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011).
7. For example, if only the incumbent directors are on a corporation's proxy ballot, then
their election is basically guaranteed in a plurality voting system. If only a small percentage of
shareholders vote for the incumbents-say, 10%--and the other 90% of shareholders do not vote
for any directors, then those directors would win the election. However, it is clear in this example
that it is possible that the majority of shareholders do not approve of the performance of the board.
In a majority voting system, these directors would not be elected to the board.
8. See McBride & Bissel, supra note 4, at 1 ("Proponents argue that majority voting would
give stockholders greater power to unseat directors on underperforming boards, and thus may help
cure a variety of corporate governance ailments, such as excessive executive compensation,
entrenchment, and board indifference to lackluster management performance.").
9. See LATHAM & WATKINS, M&A DEAL COMMENTARY: MAJORITY VOTING FOR DIRECTORS:
THE LATEST CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, (2005), http://www.1w.comlupload/pubContent/
_pdflpubl437_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/KA83-LNNF].
10. See id. ("Majority voting for directors will be one of the 'hottest' corporate governance
initiatives in the 2006 proxy season . . . . Boards are being forced [by activist investors] to decide
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In the noncorporate context of political elections, a similar voter
empowerment movement has given rise to the popularity of Instant
Runoff Voting ("IRV")."I Proponents of IRV believe that plurality voting
schemes suppress new ideas and new candidates, devalue the vote of
each voter, and encourage negative campaign tactics. 12 However, when
more than two legitimate candidates run in a majority vote election,
often no single candidate will receive a majority of the votes, leading to
a costly and inefficient return of voters to the polls. IRV has been touted
as a clean solution to this problem, allowing for a majority vote while
preventing the need for voters to return to the polls for a runoff.13
However, IRV has not yet caught on in the corporate shareholder
empowerment movement. 14 This Note addresses how IRV can be used
in corporate elections and whether corporations and shareholders
should support IRV. First, in Sections I.A--I.D, this Note lays out the
mechanics and history of IRV and analyzes the history of IRV in
political elections. Part II offers a possible IRV scheme that
corporations could utilize for their director elections that combines
short-slate elections with IRV. Part III explains the benefits that IRV
may provide to a corporate election. Conversely, Part IV lays out the
disadvantages of using IRV in the corporate context. Finally, Part V
explains that, while IRV may prove to be a useful option for smaller
companies looking to increase shareholder empowerment, it likely
presents too great a financial burden and logistical challenge for larger
companies to implement.
whether to fight majority voting shareholder proposals or to adopt either modified, and arguably
less radical versions, of majority voting or full-fledged majority voting for directors.").
11. See Brian P. Marron, One Person, One Vote, Several Elections? Instant Runoff Voting and
the Constitution, 28 VT. L. REV. 343, 352 (2004) ('The major way instant runoff voting can increase
the political empowerment of racial minorities is that it may eliminate the phenomenon of electoral
capture."); see also Robert Richie, Instant Runoff Voting: What Mexico (and Others) Could Learn,
3 ELECTION L.J. 501, 502 (2004) ("[IRV] promotes good government values of boosting voter turnout
in the decisive election and reducing personal attacks in campaigns.").
12. FAIR VOTE, WHAT IS IRV?, http://www.fairvote.org/what-is-irv/#.Us3FIRXk4A
[http://perma.cclDV6Y-GHZR].
13. See id. ("Compared to traditional runoff elections, IRV saves tax dollars, reduces money
in politics and elects winners when turnout is highest.").
14. See Verret, supra note 3, at 1054-55 ("[Tjhe concept of runoffs [and Instant Runoff
Voting] in contested corporate elections has been wrongfully left off the table of alternatives
discussed in the shareholder democracy debate and is deserving of further study.").
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A. Mechanics of IRV
In an IRV scheme, voters are asked to rank candidates on their
ballots instead of casting a single vote for one candidate. 15 Every IRV
scheme employs a majority voting threshold, meaning that a winner
must receive greater than 50% of the vote in order to win.16 If no
candidate has a majority from the initial vote, the candidate receiving
the fewest first-place votes is excluded from ballots and the first-place
votes are recalculated. To illustrate how IRV would work in a three-
candidate pool, let's imagine that 100 Vanderbilt Law students are
given the right to vote for Vanderbilt's football coach next year. The
candidates are Franklin ("F'), Cutcliffe ("C"), and Kiffin ("K"). Every
voter can cast his vote for 1, 2, or 3 candidates, and the voter ranks the
candidates on the ballot in order of preference. Imagine that the ballots
are voted as follows (diagramed below): 25 voters cast a ballot that
ranked F first, C second, and K third (the first column); 25 ranked C
first, F second, and K third (the second column); and so on. The last
column represents 8 voters that cast ballots ranking C first, and no
candidate second or third.
Table 1: Round One of IRV Exam ple
Column Number 1 21 3 4 5 6
Ranking/number of ballots 25 25 20 10 12 8
1st F C K K F C
2nd C F C F
3rd K K F
In a simple plurality scheme, Franklin would have won, as 37%
of students voted Franklin as their first choice (columns 1 and 5),
compared to 33% for Cutcliffe (columns 2 and 6) and 30 percent for
Kiffin (columns 3 and 4). With IRV, however, since no majority was
reached in the first round because no candidate received greater than
50 percent of the vote, we disqualify the candidate with the fewest
number of first-place votes (here, Kiffin).' 7 Then, for those ballots that
15. Joseph Ornstein & Robert Z. Norman, Frequency of Monotonicity Failure Under Instant
Runoff Voting: Estimates Based on a Spatial Model of Elections, 169 PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 1 (2013).
16. Id.
17. To see how IRV is explained in legislative materials, here is the text from San Francisco's
municipal code:
If a candidate receives a majority of the first choices, that candidate shall be declared
elected. If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate who received the fewest first
choices shall be eliminated and each vote cast for that candidate shall be transferred to
the next ranked candidate on that voters ballot. If, after this transfer of votes, any
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had Kiffin listed, we remove Kiffin from the ballot and move the other
candidates up to fill his place (for example, the ballots represented by
the third column are now read to vote C first and F second, since K,
their first choice, has been eliminated). Thus, for the second round of
IRV, the ballots look as follows:
Table 2: Round Two of IRV Example
Column Number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ranking/number of ballots (after removing K) 25 25 20 10 12 8
1st F C F F C
2nd C F F
3rd
After two rounds, then, Franklin has received 47 first-place
votes (columns 1, 4, and 5), compared to Cutcliffe's 53 first-place votes
(columns 2, 3, and 6). Since 53/100 is a majority (53 percent), Cutcliffe
is declared the winner of the election. In a more complex election with
a greater number of candidates, we would continue to eliminate the
candidate who receives the least number of first place votes every round
until we have reached a point where a candidate has received a majority
of the first-place votes for that round. That candidate is then declared
the winner of the election.
B. History of IRV in the United States
Although the vast majority of IRV schemes currently in use in
the United States have been implemented within the past fifteen years,
the roots of IRV can be traced back to the early twentieth century.' 8 In
1912, the state of Minnesota enacted a modified form of IRV for its
primary elections, which included elections for city, county, district, and
state offices. 19 However, due in part to difficulties faced by judges who
were not familiar with the proper method of counting the votes, voters
repealed the state's IRV scheme only three years later, in 1915.20
In 1974, voters in Ann Arbor, Michigan, approved the use of a
modified IRV scheme for their mayoral elections. 21 Voters approved the
candidate has a majority of the votes from the continuing ballots, that candidate shall
be declared elected. S.F. CITY CHARTER, art. XIII, § 13.102(c).
18. Tony Anderson Solgard & Paul Landskroener, Municipal Voting Reform: Overcoming the
Legal Obstacles, 59 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 16, 16 (2002).
19. Id. at 17-19.
20. Id.
21. Benjamin Walter, Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), History of Use in Ann Arbor, GREEN
PARTY OF MICHIGAN, http://web.archive.org/web/20131110220942/http://migreens.org/hvgreens/
aa-irv0l.htm (last updated Aug. 26, 2001) [http://perma.cc/CVG2-XMM5].
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measure by a 52% to 48% margin, with voting closely following party
lines-Republicans against the measure, and Democrats for it.2 2 In the
following mayoral election, incumbent Republican James Stephenson
sought reelection, having won the previous mayoral race by receiving
47% of the vote in a plurality voting system and benefitting from vote
splitting among liberal voters. 23 The first round of voting saw 49%
support for Stephenson, 40% support for Albert Wheeler, the
Democratic candidate, and 11% support for the Human Rights Party
candidate. 24 However, since there was no majority reached in the first
round, the third-party candidate was eliminated from the election, and
the second choice of all the ballots that ranked the third-party candidate
first were counted as first-place votes.25 Almost all of those ballots had
Wheeler, the Democrat, ranked as their initial second choice and
subsequent first choice. 26 This resulted in Wheeler winning the election
by the slim margin of 121 votes, even though Stephenson had handily
beaten Wheeler in first-place votes. 27
The IRV voting system was short-lived, however, due in part to
public skepticism toward it. This was prompted by election officials
requiring weeks to certify the vote and a study after the election that
showed that the paper ballots and unprepared election workers led to
confusion among the voters as to how they were supposed to vote. 28
Although a Michigan circuit court held that the voting scheme was
constitutional, Ann Arbor voters repealed IRV in a special election the
following year. 29 After this voter rejection, IRV did not make a major
impact again until the early 2000s.30
In 2004, San Francisco enacted an IRV scheme, resulting in a
resurgence of IRV among American municipalities. 31 San Francisco
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Elise Helgesen, All States (IRV): The Courts Got it Right: Recognizing that Instant Runoff
Voting Makes Every Vote Count, STATE OF ELECTIONS: WILLIAM & MARY ELECTION LAw SOCIETY
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://electis.blogs.wm.edu/2011/10/31/the-courts-got-it-right-recognizing-that-
instant-runoff-voting-makes-every-vote-count [http://perma.cc/WHR6-GWHP]; Walter, supra note
21.
30. Jeffrey C. O'Neill, Everything That Can be Counted Does Not Necessarily Count: The
Right to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327, 334 (2006).
31. Dean E. Murphy, New Runoff System in San Francisco Has the Rival Candidates
Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES, (Sep. 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/30/nationall
30runoff.html?_r-0 [http://perma.cc/ SV7K-2YEN]; San Francisco Successfully Uses Ranked
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enacted IRV to elect its mayor, sheriff, district and city attorney, and
other public officials. 32 The first IRV election was a success: winners in
the elections for the city attorney and treasurer did not require a runoff,
as the front-runners won a majority in the first round, and the assessor-
recorder won a majority in the second round, after the third-place
candidate was eliminated. 33 Having an instant runoff for the assessor-
recorder saved the city millions of dollars by eliminating the need to
have a runoff election, a process that usually results in low voter
turnout.34 Proponents of IRV were quick to celebrate San Francisco's
successful implementation of the first IRV scheme in a major U.S. city
since the 1970s. 35 Unlike Ann Arbor and Minnesota, San Francisco
found continued success using IRV, saving the city time and money with
each election, according to proponents of the system.36 However, critics
have continued to point out that IRV can lead to voter confusion, invalid
ballots,37 and overly conciliatory candidates. 38
After San Francisco brought IRV back to the forefront of the
election reform movement, other municipalities and states soon
followed. In 2010, North Carolina held three IRV elections for superior
Choice Voting for Citywide Elections, SAN FRANCISCO RESOURCES ON RANKED CHOICE VOTING
(Nov. 2005), http://www.sfrcv.com/ [http://perma.cc/P53L-XF2A].
32. S.F. CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102(b):
The Mayor, Sheriff, District Attorney, City Attorney, Treasurer, Assessor-Recorder,
Public Defender, and members of the Board of Supervisors shall be elected using a
ranked-choice, or 'instant runoff,' ballot. The ballot shall allow voters to rank a number
of choices in order of preference equal to the total number of candidates for each office;
provided, however, if the voting system, vote tabulation system or similar or related
equipment used by the City and County cannot feasibly accommodate choices equal to
the total number of candidates running for each office, then the Director of Elections
may limit the number of choices a voter may rank to no fewer than three. The ballot
shall in no way interfere with a voter's ability to cast a vote for a write-in candidate.
33. San Francisco Successfully Uses Ranked Choice Voting, supra note 31.
34. Id.; see Murphy, supra note 31 ('The system removes the need for a separate runoff
election, saving money and, if the recent past is a guide, increasing the number of voters who have
a say in choosing the winner. Under the old system, turnout usually dropped significantly in
runoffs.").
35. Murphy, supra note 31.
36. Vauhini Vara, 'Instant Runoff' Faces Test: San Francisco Election Showcases Voting
Method Aimed at Encouraging Civility, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204774604576631212229446284
[http://perma.cc/T32Z-93J9] ("Proponents of ranked-choice voting say it leads to more civility in
races, as candidates seek to avoid alienating people who prefer another candidate but might list
them as an alternate. It also helps cities avoid the expense and hassle of holding a runoff election
if no one wins half of overall votes-a ballot that would cost San Francisco $2.5 million to $3
million, according to Director of Elections John Arntz.").
37. For an explanation of how IRV can lead to voter confusion and invalid ballots, see infra
Section IV.C.
38. Vara, supra note 36. According to one proponent-turned critic of IRV, "[IRV] sounded
really good-it was all unicorns and rainbows-but it hasn't lived up to any of its promises." Id.
1342
2015] INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING IN ELECTIONS 1343
court judges and a statewide IRV election for a seat on the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, making North Carolina the first state to use
IRV in a statewide race. 39 However, in August 2013, North Carolina
repealed IRV for appellate court seats that became vacant within two
months of the election, due in part to widespread voter confusion
concerning the IRV scheme.40 Other municipalities that have passed
referendums to implement IRV include Memphis, Tennessee; 41 Saint
Paul, Minnesota; 42 Portland, Maine; 43 Cary, North Carolina;44 Santa Fe,
New Mexico; 45 and many others.46
Moreover, many professional and educational organizations
have implemented some form of IRV to elect their boards of directors,
presidents, and other officers.47 In fact, Robert's Rules of Order
recommends using IRV in organizational elections conducted by mail,
as a traditional majority voting scheme could lead to greater costs in
39. DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA BLOG (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.democracy-
nc.org/news/blog/2010/08/10/tuesday-august-10-2010/ [http://perma.cc/XN7R-WRSZ]; Rob Richie,
North Carolina Uses Instant Runoff Voting for State, County-Wide Elections, FAIR VOTE (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-analysis/blog/north-carolina/,[http://perma.cc/YES8-
G47E].
40. Mark Binker, Q&A: Changes to NC Election Laws, WRAL.COM (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.wral.com/election-changes-coming-in-2014-2016/12750290/ [http://perma.cc/98LB-
QFQTJ:
North Carolina had created an instant runoff system to fill appellate court seats that
become vacant less than two months before an election. The system requires voters to
mark their first, second and third choices for an office, rather than returning to the polls
when a candidate obtains only a plurality of the vote. When it was used in 2010, that
system met with mixed reviews from voters. House Bill 589 eliminates the instant
runoff system for judicial races."
41. Campaigns for IRV, INSTANTRUNOFF.COM, http://instantrunoff.com/instant-runoff-
home/in-action/campaigns-for-irv/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) [http://perma.cc/892Y-UYQH].
42. Rochelle Olson, Ranked Voting Gets First Runoff Test, STARTRIBUNE, (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.startribune.comlocal/stpaul/133581068.html [http://perma.cc/3PMY-7YLP].
43. Seth Koenig, Brennan to Become Portland's First Popularly Elected Mayor in 88 Years,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, (Nov. 9, 2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/11/09/news/portland/
brennan-to-become-portland%E2%80%99s-first-popularly-elected-mayor-in-88-years/
[http://perma.ce/F2EX-AQKF].
44. Cary NC Tries JiRV, Then Says 'No More,' VOTING MATTERS BLOG (May 17, 2009),
http://votingmatters.wordpress.com/2009/05/17/cary-nc-tries-irv-then-says-no-more/
[http://perma.cc/YG5B-7L7Y].
45. Rick Lass, Ranked Choice Voting Approved by Santa Fe Voters, GREEN PAGES (July 11,
2008), http://gp.org/greenpages-blog/?p=145 [http://perma.cc/PHF9-AJWL].
46. Where Instant Runoff is Used, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/where-instant-runoff-
is-used#.Us7hivRXk4A (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) [http://perma.cc/JZJ9-6LNQ].
47. Organizations and Corporations Using Ranked Choice Voting, FAIRVOTE,
http://www.fairvote.org/organizations-and-corporations-using-ranked-choice-
voting#.Us72zfRXk4A (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) [http://perma.cc/6GQ8-ZGYQ]. Such
organizations include the American Bar Association Law Student Division, the American
Chemical Society, the American Psychiatric Association, the National Organization for Women,
the Society of Actuaries, and the Professional Risk Managers' International Association. Id.
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the case that a runoff were necessary. 48 However, few for-profit
corporations have implemented an IRV scheme to elect their boards of
directors, and it is likely that no publically traded company has
implemented IRV.4 9
C. Legal Challenges to IRV in Political Elections
A number of court cases have dealt with the validity of IRV in
political elections. Opponents of IRV have claimed that IRV violates
constitutional notions of due process and equal protection. Several
equal protection challenges have argued that IRV gives more weight to
the ballots of some voters than others, thus creating inequities in the
voting process. However, courts have not been sympathetic to these
claims, and no IRV voting system has been invalidated to date.
In the heated 1975 Ann Arbor mayoral race, described above in
Section B, the eventual second-place candidate, Stephenson, brought
suit in a Michigan circuit court challenging the constitutionality of the
Preferential Voting (i.e., instant runoff) system.50 Stephenson claimed
that the voting scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Michigan Constitution.51 The
court wrestled with the question of whether the voting system
"afford[ed] equal protection to each voter" or instead created "inequities
and inequalities," as the constitutionality of the system depended on
this determination. 5 2 Stephenson's main contention was that some
voters had their voice heard twice: namely, those whose first choice was
eliminated, thus giving them a vote for their second choice in the next
round. 53 Thus, the plaintiff asserted that the voting system "create[d]
separate classes of voters and afford[ed] the vote of some more weight
than others."54
However, the court held that all voters possessed the same
rights-the right to, or right not to, "select and list their preferences in
48. Roberts Rules of Order, FAiRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/instant-runoff-
voting/where-instant-runoff-is-used/roberts-rules-of-order/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015)
[http://perma.cclXH6S-RV2L].
49. Organizations and Corporations Using Ranked Choice Voting, supra note 47.
50. Stephenson v. Ann Arbor Board of Canvassers, No. 75-10166 AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov.
1975), http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/instant-runoff-voting/irv-resources/model-legislation-2/
ann-arbor-michigan-charter-amendment/stephenson-v-ann-arbor-board-of-canvassers/
[http://perma.ccl2TND-BUJM].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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numerical order."55 Moreover, all voters had the same rights to decide
who their second or third choices would be.56 Lastly, the court held that
no voters were restricted in their rights, as each voter "voted with this
same understanding that his second and third choice preferences could
be counted if his or her first choice was the candidate with the least
number of votes." 5 7 Thus, the IRV system did not create any
"classification" of voters, and the court held that the system was a
permissible voting scheme.58
Over forty years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a
similar claim that IRV facially violated voters' equal protection rights.5 9
The appellants argued that IRV burdens a citizen's right to vote in
multiple ways, including giving some votes more weight than others, by
allowing a voter's second choice to harm their first choice candidate, and
by "creating the possibility that casting a vote for a preferred candidate
may harm the chances for that candidate to win office."60
First, the court rejected the contention that votes cast for a
candidate who is not eliminated in the first round are unequally
weighted, as opposed to votes cast for an eliminated candidate, and
violative of the one-person, one-vote principle.61 Appellants contended
that a vote cast for a continuing candidate counted less than those votes
for an eliminated candidate, since voters who voted for the eliminated
candidate received the chance to vote for a different candidate in the
next round.62 The court reasoned that a vote for a continuing candidate
equally influences the next round, as that vote for the continuing
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Minn. Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 685, 688 (Minn. 2009).
("Because IRV has not yet been implemented, appellants challenge the municipal law on its face,
rather than as applied.").
60. Id. at 689.
61. Id. at 690; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558-60 (1964) (recognizing the "one-
person, one-vote" principle).
62. Minn. Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 690:
The central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument is that in the second
round, first-choice votes cast for continuing candidates were exhausted in the first
round and have no further opportunity to affect the election. Appellants claim that, in
contrast, voters who cast their first-choice vote for the eliminated candidate get a second
chance to influence the election by having their second-choice votes, for a different
candidate, counted in the second round.
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candidate is counted again in the following round.63 Thus, each ballot is
able to influence the next round equally.64
To explain its reasoning, the court compared IRV to a simple
plurality vote with a primary election.65 In this hypothetical primary
election, voters would choose between several candidates, and the top
two candidates would move on to the general election.66 Then, voters
would choose between those two candidates: if one citizen voted for one
of the top two in the primary, then that citizen would vote for that
candidate again; but, if a different citizen voted for one of the eliminated
candidates, then that voter would cast the vote for his preference
between the two remaining candidates.67 Since these two votes counted
equally in this round, the court reasoned that there was no unequal
weighting of votes in an IRV scheme.68
The appellants also challenged the IRV scheme as
unconstitutional based on the potential for nonmonotonicity. 69 Briefly,
a nonmonotonic voting scheme is susceptible to two types of monotonic
failure: one occurs when a winner of an election would have lost the
election if the candidate was ranked higher by a certain subset of voters,
and the other occurs when a losing candidate would have won if a
certain subset of voters had voted that candidate lower.70 Both parties
agreed with the district court that the Minneapolis IRV system is
63. Id.:
Just because the vote is not counted for a different candidate in the new round (as is
the vote originally cast for an eliminated candidate), does not mean that the ballot was
exhausted, that the vote for the continuing candidate is not counted in the subsequent
rounds, or that the voter has lost the ability to affect the outcome of the election.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 690-91.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 691:
A vote in the general election still counts and affects the election, even though it is for
the same candidate selected in the primary. Appellants attempt to distinguish the
primary/general election system on the basis that those elections are separate,
independent events, but the effect in terms of the counting of votes is the same.
The court also differentiated between voting schemes that count more than one vote per round,
unlike the IRV scheme at issue. Id. at 692:
Because votes were cumulated in the Duluth system, after the first round a voter could
have more than one vote counted at the same time. Under IRV, only one vote per voter
can be counted in each round, just as in serial primary/general elections a voter may
vote only once per election. . . . In IRV, a voter's subsequent choices are not counted
unless the voter's higher-choice candidate has been eliminated (or elected, in a multiple-
seat race), so a voter's subsequent choices cannot count against his first-choice
candidate.
69. Id. at 695. For a more in-depth discussion of IRV's potential for monotonicity failure, see
infra Section IV.B.
70. Ornstein & Norman, supra note 15, at 2.
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nonmonotonic.71 However, respondents disagreed with the appellant's
claim that nonmonotonicity can affect the constitutionality of a voting
system.72 The appellants were fighting an uphill battle here, since they
could not cite any case authority that applied monotonicity as a legal
standard for determining the validity of a voting scheme.73 Instead,
they merely asserted that the possibility of a voter hurting his preferred
candidate's chances to win by ranking that candidate higher
"necessarily burdens the right to vote and is unconstitutional." 74
Respondents countered by explaining that monotonicity is only one of
several desirable characteristics of voting schemes described by
economist Kenneth Arrow and thus not a constitutional requirement
for a voting system.75 The court also pointed out that it has been proven
mathematically that it is impossible for a voting scheme to satisfy all of
Arrow's desirable characteristics of voting schemes. 76 Thus,
respondents contended that since no voting scheme can satisfy all of
these desirable characteristics, it would be illogical to make any of them
a constitutional requirement.77 The court concluded by admitting that
it is "disconcerting" to acknowledge that a vote for a candidate may
indeed hurt, rather than help, that candidate, but reasoned that any
system that involves a process for narrowing a field of several
candidates will have the potential for nonmonotonicity.78 The court
71. Minn. Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 695. Interestingly, the district court also concluded
that Minneapolis nonpartisan primaries, the election that the IRV scheme was destined to replace,
was nonmonotonic. Id.:
It is at that stage that the primary/general election system is non-monotonic [sic]. This
is illustrated by the fact that in some circumstances, a voter can increase her preferred
candidate's chances to win office by voting in the primary for a non-preferred candidate
who would be a weaker opponent for her preferred candidate. By helping the non-
preferred, but weaker, candidate succeed in the primary, the voter can help her
preferred candidate win the general election. Conversely, voting for the preferred
candidate and denying the weaker, non-preferred candidate that primary vote, could
allow a stronger opponent to advance-and the stronger opponent could defeat the
preferred candidate in the general election.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. These desirable characteristics are explained by economist Kenneth Arrow in his
book, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
76. Minn. Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 695. This proof is known as Arrow's Theorem.
Every voting scheme violates some aspect of Arrow's Theorem. For example, a simple plurality
scheme violates the requirement of independence from irrelevant alternatives. For a more in-depth
explanation of Arrow's Theorem in an accessible article in MITs student newspaper, see Nathan
Collins, Arrow's Theorem Proves No Voting System is Perfect, THE TECH, Feb. 28, 2003, at 14,
http://tech.mit.eduN123/PDFN123-N8.pdf [http://perma.cc/S2LL-SUPB].
77. Minn. Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 695.
78. Id. at 696. The court also takes issue with the fact that the appellants never provided
evidence of how frequently a nonmonotonic effect may occur in real world voting scenarios. Thus,
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affirmed the district court's ruling and held the IRV scheme
constitutional.7 9
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has gone further and upheld a
variation of IRV known as "restricted IRV."8 0 The restricted IRV system
adopted by San Francisco at issue in the case allowed voters to rank
only three choices, instead of allowing them to rank all candidates,
when the voting equipment is not able to handle a full ballot. 1 In fact,
in every election predating this case, San Francisco had used "restricted
IRV" instead of allowing voters to fill out a complete ballot. 82 The
plaintiffs claimed that this restriction on the ballot disenfranchises
voters.83 For example, in a five-candidate election with restricted IRV,
voters are only allowed to rank three of the candidates. 84 So, if one voter
ranks three candidates, but does not rank either of the final two
candidates (because she was limited to only three), then that voter is
unable to influence the final round in which the winner is chosen.85 To
the plaintiffs, this outcome was akin to stopping a qualified voter from
voting in a two-candidate runoff after a primary involving five
candidates just because her least favorite candidates made it to the
runoff.86
it is difficult to say that IRV facially burdens the right to vote or severely burdens the right to vote,
since the magnitude of the effects are unknown. Id.
79. Id. at 698.
80. Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
81. Id. at 1101. The text of the city charter itself reads as follows:
The ballot shall allow voters to rank a number of choices in order of preference equal to
the total number of candidates for each office; provided, however, if the voting system,
vote tabulation system or similar or related equipment used by the City and County
cannot feasibly accommodate choices equal to the total number of candidates running
for each office, then the Director of Elections may limit the number of choices a voter
may rank to no fewer than three. The ballot shall in no way interfere with a voter's
ability to cast a vote for a write-in candidate.
S.F. City Charter, Art. XIII, § 13.102(b).
82. Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1101. The court explains that this choice by the city was necessary:
San Francisco maintains, and the plaintiffs, several San Francisco voters (collectively
"Dudum"), do not dispute, that this choice is one of necessity: The voting machines
currently in use are not equipped to tabulate unlimited rankings; cost and logistical
concerns make accommodating the unlimited option untenable; and providing a ballot
on which voters may rank every candidate in a large field could result in confusion,
voter error, and inaccuracies in vote calculation.
Id.
83. Id. at 1102.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. The idea is that in a normal runoff system, the voter whose bottom two choices made
the final runoff would still have an opportunity to express her preference by voting for her favorite
of the two. In restricted IRV, since she did not rank either of those two, her least favorite, she
would be given no voice or influence in the final round between those two candidates.
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However, the court reasoned that this analogy was "off the mark
in describing the real impacts of restricted IRV on voters' opportunities
to cast ballots."8 7 The court agreed that IRV can be seen as a
replacement for a traditional two-stage runoff election, but the court
refused to accept the contention that IRV has to be a replica of a two-
stage runoff election.88 The court held, therefore, that restricted IRV
affords all voters a "single and equal opportunity to express their
preferences for three candidates" by choosing to vote for zero, one, two,
or three of the candidates.89 By focusing on the instant that the voter
casts his vote, the court concluded that all voters have an equal
influence on the election at that moment at the polls, regardless of the
eventual outcome of the various rounds of the IRV scheme.90 In other
words, no single voter or class of voters is afforded less of a voice in the
election process at the time of the ballot casting, so there is no violation
of the Equal Protection Clause for that aspect of San Francisco's
restricted IRV.91
The plaintiffs also claimed that "exhausted" ballots, those
ballots for which every chosen candidate had been eliminated, were
discarded and not counted in the voting process. 92 However, the court
reasoned that these votes were indeed counted, but they were "counted"
for the losing candidate, just as those votes for a losing candidate in a
plurality system are "counted."93 The plaintiffs final charge was that
87. Id. at 1107.
88. See id. at 1107-08:
Restricted IRV, of course, can be used in place of a two-round runoff election, which is
what occurred in San Francisco and explains why the city supervisors compared the
two. But restricted IRV does not replicate a two-round runoff system because, as we
just explained, in two-round runoffs, voters cast ballots twice-that is, make and record
their choices twice-whereas IRV allows only one chance to vote.
89. Id. at 1107.
90. See id. (noting the difference between a restricted IRV election and the two rounds of
inputs characteristic of a two-round runoff system).
91. See id. at 1109 ("[T]he City's restricted IRV system is not analogous to limitations on
voting in successive elections, because in San Francisco's system, no voter is denied an opportunity
to cast a ballot at the same time and with the same degree of choice among candidates available
to other voters.").
92. Id. ("Dudum tries a second tack: He maintains that the tabulation scheme under San
Francisco's system burdens voters' constitutional rights to vote by effectively discarding, rather
than counting, the votes from 'exhausted' ballots.").
93. Id. at 1111:
"Exhausted" ballots are counted in the election, they are just counted for losing
candidates in the tally of total votes. In the terms used by election experts, these are
"wasted" votes, not because they aren't counted, but because they were cast for
candidates not ultimately elected. Notably, both IRV and restricted IRV tend to result
in fewer entirely 'wasted' votes than plurality voting, because voters whose first-choice
candidate is eliminated may choose the winning candidate as their second- or third-
choice pick."
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the IRV scheme violated the equal protection guarantee of "one person,
one vote." 94 The plaintiffs contend that some voters are allowed more
than one vote when their votes for their second and third choice
candidates are counted, while others only get to vote once, in the first
round and first round only.95 However, the court reasoned that at each
instance of tabulation of the votes, each voter can only cast his vote
once. 96 A voter's ballot may cast a vote for a different candidate in
subsequent rounds, due to the runoff nature of the voting system, but
this does not mean that his vote is counted more than once: for every
round, the maximum vote for a voter is one.9 7
Since IRV did not impose "severe burdens on voting rights," the
court did not apply strict scrutiny.98 The court concluded by reasoning
that every voting system necessarily has some impact and burden on
the citizenry's right to vote, and the IRV system in place here is no
different.99 The court also held that any of the plaintiffs' alleged
burdens, if they exist at all, are "minimal at best."100 Lastly, the court
held that San Francisco's "important regulatory interests" clearly are
substantial enough to justify the "minimal at best" burdens imposed by
the restricted IRV voting system.101 These interests include orderly
administration of elections, monetary savings, and providing the
opportunity for voters to express "nuanced voting preferences and
[elect] candidates with strong plurality support." 102
D. Legality of IRV Under Delaware and Federal Securities Law
There do not appear to be any legitimate legal concerns with
implementing an IRV system for corporate elections under Delaware or
federal securities law. Opponents of implementing an IRV scheme in a
corporate election could argue that IRV violates the Equal Protection
Clause, similar to the claims brought by the plaintiffs of the cases
explained in Section C. However, this argument may be frivolous since
there do not appear to be any cases successfully challenging a corporate
94. Id. at 1112.
95. Id.
96. Id. ("[T]he option to rank multiple preferences is not the same as providing additional
votes, or more heavily-weighted votes, relative to other votes cast.").
97. Id. ('The ability to rank multiple candidates simply provides a chance to have several
preferences recorded and counted sequentially, not at once.").
98. Id. at 1114.
99. See id. at 1113.
100. Id. at 1113-14.
101. Id. at 1114.
102. Id. at 1115-16.
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election on equal protection grounds. Opponents could also claim that
federal securities law forbids corporations from listing common stock
that has "unequal voting rights" on national security exchanges.103
Lastly, opponents of IRV in Delaware corporations could claim that IRV
violates section 212 of the Delaware corporate code, which provides that
each shareholder is entitled to one vote per share of common stock,
unless otherwise provided in the corporation's bylaws. 104 However, as
explained below, opponents of IRV are not likely to succeed in making
any of these claims.
First, opponents could argue that IRV violates the Equal
Protection Clause by claiming that IRV gives greater weight to some
shareholder's ballots than others. However, as seen in Section I.C,
courts have not been sympathetic to such claims. 05 Courts have held
that in political elections, each voter is given the same rights as every
other voter, and thus there is no violation of equal protection with an
IRV election.106 And, given that courts apply the strictest scrutiny when
adjudicating claims based on equal protection in the context of political
elections, it is very unlikely that courts would hold that IRV in the
corporate context, as opposed to IRV in the political context, violates
the Equal Protection Clause. 107
Opponents could also claim that an IRV scheme violates SEC
Rule 19c-4, which states that no security may be listed on a national
exchange if the issuer of the security takes "corporate action [that has
the] effect of nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the per
share voting rights of holders of an outstanding class . .. of common
stock . . . ."108 However, similar to the Equal Protection Clause
argument, this argument is unlikely to succeed. Courts are likely to use
the same reasoning seen in the Equal Protection Clause cases to hold
that shareholders' voting rights are not reduced or restricted in an IRV
election, as each shareholder would still possess the same voting rights
as every other shareholder.109 Moreover, one federal appeals court has
ruled that Rule 19c-4 is invalid, as the rule exceeded the SEC's
103. See Richard S. Dalebout, Cumulative Voting for Corporation Directors: Majority
Shareholders in the Role of a Fox Guarding a Hen House, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1199, 1220-21 (1989)
(referring to the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 19c-4, which addresses unequal
voting rights).
104. See 8. Del. C. § 212(a).
105. See supra section I.C.
106. See supra section I.C.
107. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to a campaign
expenditure provision).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a) (2015).
109. See supra section I.C.
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statutory authority by promulgating rules relating to corporate voting
rights, a traditional state domain. 110 Thus, this claim is unlikely to
succeed in invalidating an IRV voting scheme in a corporate election.
Although SEC Rule 14a-4 lays out the requirements of the proxy
statement, IRV does not appear to violate any of the stated
requirements."' IRV will also fulfill the requirement that the corporate
proxy statement provide means for a shareholder to withhold her vote
for any management director nominee, as the shareholders are able to
vote for dissidents, or simply abstain from voting for the incumbents. 112
Moreover, an IRV system should pass muster under existing
Delaware corporate law. First, all elections of directors for Delaware
corporations must be by written ballot, unless otherwise authorized in
the certificate of incorporation. 1 13 As a general standard, directors of
Delaware corporations shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the
shares voting, but this requirement may be changed by a specification
110. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (1990) ("Because the rule directly
controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of shareholders, we find it in excess of
the Commission's authority under § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . ."); see also
Thomas Lee Hazen, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.1 (6th ed. 2014)
("Notwithstanding the development of exchange and Nasdaq voting rights rules, the primary
source of shareholder voting rights remains the law of the state of incorporation. Many state
statutes permit shareholders to have disparate voting rights.").
111. 17 C.F.R. § 14a-4(b)(1) (2015):
Means shall be provided in the form of proxy whereby the person solicited is afforded
an opportunity to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval of, or
abstention with respect to each separate matter referred to therein as intended to be
acted upon, other than elections to office . . . . A proxy may confer discretionary
authority with respect to matters as to which a choice is not specified by the security
holder provided that the form of proxy states in bold-face type how it is intended to vote
the shares represented by the proxy in each such case."
112. § 14a-4(b)(2):
A form of proxy that provides for the election of directors shall set forth the names of
persons nominated for election as directors.. . . Such form of proxy shall clearly provide
any of the following means for security holders to withhold authority to vote for each
nominee: A box opposite the name of each nominee which may be marked to indicate
that authority to vote for such nominee is withheld; or [an instruction in bold-face type
which indicates that the security holder may withhold authority to vote for any nominee
by lining through or otherwise striking out the name of any nominee; or [d]esignated
blank spaces in which the security holder may enter the names of nominees with respect
to whom the security holder chooses to withhold authority to vote; or [any other similar
means, provided that clear instructions are furnished indicating how the security
holder may withhold authority to vote for any nominee.
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 211(e) (2015):
All elections of directors shall be by written ballot unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation; if authorized by the board of directors, such requirement of
a written ballot shall be satisfied by a ballot submitted by electronic transmission,
provided that any such electronic transmission must either set forth or be submitted
with information from which it can be determined that the electronic transmission was
authorized by the stockholder or proxy holder.
INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING IN ELECTIONS
in the certificate of incorporation or in the bylaws of the corporation. 114
Thus, implementing an IRV system should not violate any of these
Delaware laws dealing with election of directors.
One possible legal hurdle for an IRV system concerns the voting
rights of shareholders. Under Delaware law, "each stockholder shall be
entitled to one vote for each share of capital stock held by such
stockholder" unless otherwise provided in the certificate of
incorporation.115 Opponents of IRV could make the argument that IRV
gives stockholders more than one vote, or less than one vote, similar to
the arguments made in the political election cases. 16 However, given
that courts have not looked favorably on these types of arguments in
the political context, when voters' rights are more heavily protected
under the U.S. Constitution, it is unlikely that Delaware courts would
be persuaded that IRV burdens the shareholders' right to vote in
corporate elections.117 However, no cases were found that would shed
light onto how a Delaware court would treat an IRV system." 8 Given
that Delaware has historically been "flexib[1e] in their basic governance
arrangements," a corporation should be able to implement an IRV
scheme under Delaware law.119
II. How TO IMPLEMENT IRV IN CORPORATE ELECTIONS: COMBINE
SHORT-SLATE ELECTIONS WITH IRV
Since IRV systems are often used for single-winner elections, it
may seem that IRV is not suitable for corporate elections. However, by
combining IRV with shareholder access to the corporate proxy card and
short-slate elections, IRV may prove to be a viable voting system for a
corporation.
A. Shareholder Proxy Access and Short Slates
To begin, we need to understand short slates and the advent of
shareholder proxy access. Before the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,
shareholders did not have the ability to place director nominees onto
114. § 216(3).
115. § 212(a).
116. See supra Section I.C (dealing with legal challenges to IRV).
117. See supra Section I.C.
118. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the
Election of Directors, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 459 (2007) (discussing the increase and legality of majority
voting in corporate elections).
119. McBride & Bissell, supra note 4, at 1.
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the corporate ballot. 12 0 For years, proponents of shareholder rights had
argued for the right of shareholders to be able to put their own
nominations on the management proxy card, thus saving the
shareholders a significant amount of money as they would not have to
send out their own proxy card.121 Because shareholder access would
make it easier for challengers to nominate their own candidates for the
board, proponents of shareholder access hoped that shareholders would
be able to take a more active and effective role in monitoring the board
and managers of the company.122 Before shareholder access, there were
very few contested elections, and proponents of shareholders' rights saw
shareholder access as a way to increase the competitiveness of corporate
elections.
Opponents of these initiatives attempted to block shareholder
access, as the large costs involved with a challenger sending out his own
shareholder proxy card frequently deterred shareholder activism. 123
However, after years of debate, the SEC finally implemented
shareholder access in August of 2010 in light of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which gave the
SEC the express authority to implement such a rule.124
Often dissident shareholders do not wish to nominate a full slate
of director candidates but merely wish to win some seats on the board.
When a challenging shareholder wishes to replace only a fraction of the
directors of a corporation, he can nominate a "short slate" of directors. 125
Before the SEC enacted regulations in 1992, minority shareholders
seeking to nominate only a fraction of the board of directors (instead of
the entire board) were limited by the Bona Fide Nominee Rule, which
gave shareholders only two choices: to vote for the full management
slate, or vote for only the dissident's short slate. 126 However, in 1992,
the SEC implemented regulations that allowed voters to vote for the
120. J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware's Future Reviewing
Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 392 (2011).
121. Id. at 395.
122. Id. at 393.
123. Id. at 395.
124. Id. at 399.
125. Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon, & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules Discourage
Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L.
29, 34 (1992).
126. See AMY L. GOODMAN, JOHN F. OLSON, LISA A. FONTENOT, LAURIE L. GREEN & AARON N.
GOLDBERG, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 9.06 (2014):
Rule 14a-4(d), the 'bona fide nominee' rule, prohibits listing a nominee on a proxy card
unless the nominee consents to being named in the dissident's proxy statement and
agrees to serve if elected. This rule had the effect of forcing shareholders in a proxy
contest seeking minority representation to choose between voting for the management
nominees to vote for a full slate, or voting for the dissident's minority slate.
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short slate of directors and fill out the rest of their ballot with nominees
from the corporate ballot.127 In recent years, short-slate proxy contests
have become more common than proxy contests for a majority of the
board. 12 8 Dissidents often prefer a short-slate proxy contest to a full-
blown contest for control of the board because short-slate contests often
garner more support from passive, non-activist investors (as opposed to
activist hedge funds). 129 Moreover, a change to the majority of the board
often will trigger certain takeover defenses, such as poison pills, while
short-slate contests do not entail this risk.1 30
B. How to Combine IRV and Short-Slate Elections
An effective way for IRV to be implemented in the corporate
context involves combining the recent right of shareholder access to the
proxy statement and utilizing a short-slate proxy contest.13 1 The way it
would work is as follows: assume that a corporation employs a ten-
person board of directors. A dissident shareholder could nominate a
short slate of three directors and place those nominations on the
corporate proxy. Then, shareholders would be given the opportunity to
rank up to thirteen candidates on their proxy card in order of
preference, giving them more control and ability to express nuanced
preferences in their vote.
After the vote, the counting begins, and seats are won one at a
time in subsequent vote tabulations. For example, in the first election,
the corporation uses the IRV system to elect the first seat on the board,
using the methodology explained in Section I.A. After ensuing rounds
of eliminating last-place candidates when no majority has been
reached, we will elect the first candidate that receives a majority of
first-place votes. Then, after that candidate is elected, we remove that
127. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RELEASE No. 31326, REGULATION OF
COMMUNICATION AMONG SHAREHOLDERS 26 (1992):
Under the amendment to Rule 14a-4(d) as adopted, a soliciting shareholder would not
be precluded by the bona fide nominee rule from undertaking to vote the proxy in favor
of the company's nominees, other than those specifically excluded by the soliciting
shareholder, so long as shareholders are provided an opportunity specifically to write
the names of any other company nominees with respect to whom they wish to withhold
voting authority from the proxy holder.
128. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 126, § 9.06 ("During the 2012 proxy season, dissidents
sought majority control at only five companies, out of 19 proxy fights. This is an increase from the
2011 proxy season, when dissidents sought a majority of the board in only one contest out of 20
proxy fights.").
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Credit goes to Vanderbilt Professor of Mathematics and Law Paul Edelman for proposing
this idea.
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candidate from all of the ballots and perform the IRV system again to
elect the second candidate to the board. Then, that candidate is taken
off the ballot after she has won her seat on the board. This process is
continued until we have filled the ten seats on the board.
III. ADVANTAGES TO USING IRV IN CORPORATE ELECTIONS
Companies may wish to implement IRV for a variety of reasons.
This Part outlines four advantages that IRV may have in corporate
elections. First, IRV may solve the "short-slate problem," as, in a
standard majority voting scheme, dissident directors on a short-slate
ballot have a harder time winning elections than incumbent directors.
Also, IRV will prevent the need for runoff elections in majority voting
schemes, saving corporations both time and money. IRV may also
prevent radical or ineffective candidates from winning a seat on the
board, as shareholders will have greater choice and control in deciding
whom to elect. Lastly, IRV has been shown to benefit minority
viewpoints in elections, which may lead to better representation of
shareholder interests.
A. Providing a Solution to the "Short-Slate Problem"
Traditional short-slate contests appear to be an effective and
lower-cost way for shareholders to exert control and oversight of
management. Unfortunately, unforeseen problems can arise with short-
slate contests, what some have labeled the "short-slate problem." 132 The
problem can be seen as follows: assume that there is a fourteen-person
board, and a minority shareholder has nominated a short slate of three
candidates. 133 Then assume that 40 percent of shareholders vote the
straight management ticket (i.e., all fourteen incumbent directors), 30
percent of shareholders vote only for the short slate of three directors,
and the last 30 percent split their votes by voting for the three short-
slate nominations and filling in the rest of the ballot with eleven out of
the fourteen incumbent directors (with the 30 percent splitting their
votes approximately evenly among the fourteen incumbents). 134 Based
on these numbers, one may expect that the minority shareholders will
win seats on the board, as 60 percent of the shareholders voted for the
three short-slate directors. 135 However, since 40 percent of the
132. Gilson, Gordon, & Pound, supra note 125, at 34.
133. Id. at 35. The example given is from Gilson's paper.
134. Id. at 36.
135. Id.
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shareholders voted for the incumbents and 30 percent of the
shareholders voted for the short slate and eleven of the incumbents
(thus giving each incumbent approximately 30 percent multiplied by
11/14 of the vote), the incumbent directors will all receive about 64
percent of the vote. 136 Then, each incumbent will have received a higher
vote total than each short-slate nominee, and the dissidents will have
received no seats on the board.137 This is a major problem for short-slate
elections, as a majority of shareholders expressed that they wanted a
change in the makeup of the board. But, given the paradoxes involved
with splitting their vote, the dissident shareholders end up receiving no
minority representation on the board, and the full incumbent board is
elected.
Implementing an IRV scheme can potentially avoid this
problem. Shareholders wishing to see a change to the board can rank
the short-slate candidates first, second, and third on their ballots, and
then rank the incumbents fourth through fourteenth. If 30 percent of
shareholders do this, and the other 30 percent simply vote for the short
slate only, then it is likely that the dissidents will receive some
representation on the board.
B. Preventing the Need for Runoff Elections in Majority
Voting Schemes
If a corporation already uses a majority voting system, then IRV
may end up reducing costs by negating the need for a separate and
costly runoff election. 138 For example, in the CalPERS example
presented later in Section IV.A, the corporation had to expend
$1,053,697 to perform its runoff election, an amount comparable to the
cost of the original election.139 Governments that implement IRV often
tout this cost-saving feature of IRV, as runoffs are very common among
majority voting systems with multiple candidates.1 40 In fact, San
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. CalPERS OPERATIONS SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION, Agenda Item 4a *1 (Sept. 14, 2010).
139. Id. at *3.
140. See Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011):
The City points to evidence that restricted IRV will save money compared to a two-
round runoff system (the election system in place prior to IRV), as each runoff election
costs the City between $1.5 million and $3 million. The interest in alleviating the costs
and administrative burdens of conducting additional elections can be 'a legitimate state
objective' that also justifies the use of IRV, given the minimal at best burdens the
system imposes on voters' constitutional rights to vote.;
Minn. Voters Alliance v. Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Minn. 2009) ("Reducing the costs and
inconvenience to voters, candidates, and taxpayers by holding only one election, increasing voter
turnout, encouraging less divisive campaigns, and fostering greater minority representation in
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Francisco has saved several hundreds of thousands of dollars by
implementing their IRV system and stopping costly runoff votes. 141
C. Preventing Polarizing or Ineffective Candidates from
Being Elected
Implementing an IRV system may prevent polarizing or
ineffective candidates from being elected to the board. Since
shareholders will each rank their candidates, they may choose to rank
radical dissident candidates towards the bottom to prevent discord on
the board of directors. This will allow voters to choose other short-slate
candidates that voters feel will be more effective without totally
disrupting the status quo of the board. Moreover, voters will also be able
to rank lazy, ineffective, and entitled incumbents low on their ballots
and replace them with candidates who may be more effective in
overseeing the management of the company.
D. Increasing Minority Representation in Elections
One possible effect of implementing IRV in political elections is
an increase in the election of candidates from minority groups. 142 For
example, in San Francisco, sixteen out of the eighteen officeholders
elected using IRV are racial minorities. 143 Although IRV may not result
in a more racially diverse board, it is clear that IRV can result in
minority voters increasing their effectiveness and influence. 144 Thus,
dissident shareholders may be able to exert more influence, leading to
more effective oversight of the management and officers of the
corporation. 145 This could be the next step in the majority voting
multiple-seat elections are all legitimate interests for the City to foster."); Comparing IRV with
Delayed Runoffs, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/comparing-irv-with-delayed-
runoffs/#.UtGyTRXk4B (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) [http://perma.cc/6LGN-Q6L6]:
The costs of conducting this second round runoff can also be substantial, as jurisdictions
must print ballots, recruit and train pollworkers, locate precincts, and prepare voting
equipment-not once, but twice. . . . However, [with IRV], taxpayers save the cost of a
second election, voters don't have to return to the polls, and candidates don't need to
fundraise and campaign for an extended period.
141. Comparing IRV with Delayed Runoffs, supra note 140.
142. Michael Benjamin, Instant Runoff Voting: Good for Democracy and the Bottom Line, CITY
& STATE (Sept. 8, 2015), http://archives.cityandstateny.com/instant-runoff-voting-good-for-
democracy-and-the-bottom-line/ [http://perma.ccl8PCK-WDQM].
143. Id.
144. Id; see also Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & David Brockington, ELECTORAL REFORM AND
MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LOCAL EXPERIMENTS WITH ALTERNATIVE ELECTIONS 107 (2003)
(stating that the authors' empirical findings suggest that alternative voting schemes do a "better
job of producing minority representation" than traditional electoral schemes).
145. Benjamin, supra note 142.
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movement, as some legal scholars have noted that majority voting
provisions, although implemented with the goal of improving
shareholder rights, are little more than "smoke and mirrors" and have
not led to greater shareholder primacy.146
IV. POTENTIAL DOWNFALLS OF IRV IN CORPORATE ELECTIONS
IRV presents some serious disadvantages as well. First, the
costs of IRV may be too great to justify implementing an IRV scheme.
Also, IRV is subject to monotonicity failure, meaning that the scheme
is subject to paradoxical results where a winner of an election would
have lost the election if the candidate were ranked higher by a certain
subset of voters. 147 Moreover, IRV often leads to voter confusion due to
its complicated processes, compared to the simplicity of a standard
plurality or majority voting scheme. Lastly, IRV may reduce the
effectiveness of dissident shareholders by reducing the number of seats
won in the proxy contest.
A. Increase in the Cost of Running Corporate Elections
One of the first major potential downsides to implementing an
IRV system is increased costs involved in running the election. 148 While
IRV systems reduce costs in the event a runoff is necessary, they
increase costs for the vast majority of elections that would not have
required a runoff. Corporate elections already impose a significant cost
on the corporation and shareholders, and those costs are significantly
increased during contested elections, when challengers also incur
significant costs. 14 9 For example, challengers seeking to replace
incumbent directors often must spend up to or greater than one million
dollars for legal fees and the cost of preparing, printing, and mailing the
proxy materials to the shareholders. 150 Challengers must also spend
146. See generally Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 118 (discussing how their "smoke and mirrors"
hypothesis of majority voting holds true due to finding no "statistically significant market reaction"
to companies implementing a majority voting requirement).
147. Ornstein & Norman, supra note 15, at 2.
148. See, e.g., CALPERS, supra note 138, at *3-4 (discussing the costs involved with
implementing an Instant Runoff System); MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP'T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND
POLICY NOTE, S.B. 292 at 4 (2006) (same); VT. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, INSTANT RUNOFF
vOTING (IRV): ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS AND COSTS 3-4 (2007) (same).
149. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth ofthe Shareholder Franchise, 93 VAND. L. REV. 675, 688-
91 (2007).
150. See id. at 688-89 ("In the recent proxy contest at Six Flags, insurgent Red Zone LLC
spent about $850,000 on legal fees and the cost of preparing, printing, and mailing proxy
materials.").
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vast amounts of money persuading shareholders to support their
candidates in the election, as they must communicate with large
numbers of shareholders and prepare and present their strategic
plans.151 Additionally, challengers will have to pay investment banker
fees, travel expenses, and fees for services of professional proxy
solicitors, bringing the overall cost-just for the challengers-in the $5
million range for a large company. 152
Costs for challenging shareholders are only made worse by the
"free-rider" problem, as other shareholders have an incentive to let one
shareholder bear the burdens of running the proxy contest. 153 In a proxy
contest, the challengers to the incumbent board must internalize all the
costs of running a campaign. 154 However, if the challengers win seats
on the board, the fact that they are minority shareholders means they
will not receive the full benefits of their actions. 155 For example, if a
minority shareholder with a significant stake in the company, say 8%,
wins his short-slate election, and this increases the value of the
company by $10 million, he will only receive $800,000 in gains,
representing his 8% stake in the company. 15 6 Thus, if the costs of the
election exceed $800,000, then it would not be in the best interest of the
minority shareholder to run the short-slate proxy contest.157
Implementing an IRV for corporate elections could exacerbate
the problem of excessive costs for a potential challenger. First, running
the proxy contest in an IRV election involves additional costs. For
example, preparing, printing, and mailing materials to shareholders
will cost more than in a traditional plurality or majority voting scheme,
since IRV ballots require more detail, paper, and postage (due to
increased weight).158 Moreover, a "winning" challenger may only receive
one or two seats on the board, a result that may decrease the benefit
conferred to the challenger as opposed to winning the full short slate of
directors. 159
Moreover, the corporation will have to incur additional costs to
run the election. When CalPERS was considering a change to an IRV
151. Id. at 689.
152. Id. at 689-90.
153. Id. at 689.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 689-90.
157. Id.
158. See CALPERS, supra note 138. CalPERS estimated the potential costs for running an
IiRV election and compared those numbers to their actual costs from their plurality and runoff
election. Id. For preparing the ballot cards, costs would go from $186,000 to $500,141. Id.
159. See Section II.B.
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voting scheme to elect its board of directors from a majority voting
scheme, it estimated that costs incurred by its organization could
increase up to about $1 million for each election.160 The corporation
would also have to implement voting hardware systems capable of
running an IRV election, which would likely cost the corporation
millions of dollars. 61
B. Vulnerability to Monotonicity Failure
A frequent criticism of IRV is that the voting system suffers from
nonmonotonicity.1 62 Monotonicity failure occurs when a winner of an
election would have lost the election if the candidate were ranked
higher by a certain subset of voters.1 68 Conversely, monotonicity failure
also occurs when a losing candidate would have won if a certain subset
of voters had voted that candidate lower. 164 A simple example, based on
an actual Burlington, Vermont, mayoral election, illustrates the
point.165 Assume that there are three candidates, A, B, and C. The
actual ballots cast are as follows:
Table 3: Original Vote (C wins election)
Ranking/number of ballots cast 150 50 120 130 80 45 200 35 60
1st A A A B B B C C C
2nd B C C A B A
3rd C A C A B
In this example, after the first round, A has 320 first-place votes,
B has 255, and C has 295. Since no candidate has a majority, B is
eliminated. By striking B from the ballot, A receives 80 more first-place
votes, and C receives 130 more. Then, C has a total of 425 first-place
votes, and A has only 400. Thus, C wins the election.
However, if C were ranked higher by a certain number of voters,
and nothing else changed, then C could have lost the election. The
ballots below represent a case where some voters ranked C higher but
160. CALPERS, supra note 138.
161. See VERMONT, supra note 148, at 15 (estimating that costs to implement an IRV system
in Vermont would be over $4 million in the first year).
162. Ornstein & Norman, supra note 15, at 1.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. For a more in-depth view, see id. or Nicholas R. Miller's paper, Monotonity Failure in
IRVElections with Three Candidates, presented to the Second World Congress of the Public Choice
Societies, March 8, 2012, http://userpages.umbc.edu/-nmiller/MF&IRV.pdf [http://perma.cc/T8A4-
C6VA]. The example provided in this paper is a simplification of the example presented in
Ornstein's paper.
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did not change anything else about their ballots. The changed ballots
are bolded (thirty voters changed from (A, C) to (C, A), and forty voters
changed from (A) to (C, A)).
Table 4: Modified Vote (ranking C higher, but B wins election)
Original number of votes cast 150 50 [ 120 1130 180 45 200 35 60
Modified number of ballots cast 150 20 80 130 80 45 200 105 60
1st A A A B BB C C C
2nd B C C A B A
3rd C B A C A B
In a monotonic voting scheme, we would expect C to win again,
as C increased her support from the original election, where she won.
Now, though, after the first round, A has 250 first-place votes, B has
255, and C has 365. Thus, as there is no majority, A is eliminated
because he is in last place. In the second round, B gets 150 new first
place votes (from the (A, B, C) voters) and C gets 20 new first-place votes
(from the (A, C, B) voters). B then has 405 first-place votes, compared
to only 385 for C. Thus, B is the winner of this election.
These results are clearly troubling, as they go against common
sense: the winner of an election should not lose if he received an
increase from his original support. However, the frequency of this
paradox is debated. For example, one study suggested that a
monotonicity failure would only happen about once per century.166 If
this is indeed the case, then a corporation should have no problem
implementing such a scheme. However, recent papers have taken issue
with such a conservative estimate. One study suggests that
monotonicity failures will likely occur with "significant frequency"
under an IRV scheme and that this frequency increases as the
competitiveness of the election increases. 167 Depending on the type of
voter distribution, the frequency could be as high as 51% of cases, with
a lower bound of 15%.168 The study concluded that IRV exhibits
"unacceptably frequent monotonicity failures." 169 A 2012 paper also
shows that IRV is often vulnerable to monotonicity failures; this author,
too, believes that upwards of "50 percent of all closely contested IRV
ballot profiles may be vulnerable" to monotonicity failure. 170 However,
the author qualified his conclusion by writing that showing that IRV is
166. Ornstein, supra note 15, at 2.
167. Id. at 5-6.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Miller, supra note 165, at 24.
1362 [Vol. 68:5:1335
INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING IN ELECTIONS
a frequent phenomenon "does not pro[ve] that it is also a relatively
significant or worrisome phenomenon."1 7 ' Once again, this 2012 study
only involves elections with three candidates, and the case with more
than three candidates is, at this point, only a "promising topic for future
research."172 Thus, any corporation looking to implement an IRV
scheme should carefully look at whether the nonmonotonic aspect of
IRV is too grave of a concern.
C. Increase in Voter Confusion
Implementing a new voting system is likely to confuse
shareholders and may lead to an unfair advantage for incumbent
directors. In 2007, the town of Cary, North Carolina, implemented an
IRV scheme for their municipal elections.1 7 3 A year later, a survey was
conducted to see whether the citizens of Cary fully understood the
mechanics and process of IRV.1 74 In the survey, 22% of the population
reported that they "do not understand [IRV] at all" a year into using the
system.175 Also, over 40% of the population ranked their understanding
of IRV as five or fewer on a nine-point scale where nine represented
complete understanding.1 76 As another example, after a close election
for a University of Virginia student office, even the candidates running
for office "could not understand the process" of IRV.1 77 It is no surprise
that the student voters were confused as well, as controversy arose
171. Id. The author goes on to write:
[T]he phenomenon itself is often misstated and/or misunderstood. Advocates of IRV
often say that there is little or no evidence that IRV produces "non-monotonic election
results." This is literally true, since an IRV "election result" itself can never be "non-
monotonic," rather it is the IRV voting system itself (i.e., the function that maps ballot
profiles into winners) which is (always) "nonmonotonic." Here (and perhaps to the point
of monotony), I have been careful to say that an IRV ballot profile (in effect, an IRV
"election result") may be "vulnerable to monotonicity failure."
Id. (footnote omitted).
172. Ornstein, supra note 15, at 9.
173. IRV 'act Sheet"from Cary NC, RANGEVOTING (Jul. 2007), http://www.rangevoting.org/
Cary123.html [http://perma.cc/JY9V-BYXU].
174. TOWN OF CARY, 2008 BIENNIAL CITIZEN SURVEY REPORT, https://www.townofcary.org/
Assets/Public+Information+Division/Public+Information+Division+PDFs/biennialsurvey/
2008BiennialSurveyReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/35ZS-L3CY].
175. Id. at 34.
176. Id.
177. Marginal Mayhem, CAVALIERDAILY.COM (Mar. 3, 2010, 1:52 AM),
http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2010/03/marginal-mayhem/ [http://perma.cc/6JGK-5WCC].
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when the plurality winner of the first two rounds lost by one vote in the
final round. 178
Although confusion can be reduced by having a robust
educational outreach to shareholders, there will likely be some
confusion over the IRV process. Confusion is detrimental to a
corporation as a whole, since confusion can reduce investor confidence,
leading to a possible discounting in the value of a corporation's
securities. This confusion is likely to be especially detrimental to
challenging shareholders, as confused voters often turn in invalid
ballots. 179 And, more often than not, voters that invalidly fill out ballots
favor insurgents rather than incumbents.180 This could possibly lead to
boards of directors strategically implementing an IRV scheme, or
another complicated voting scheme, to reduce the chances of
shareholders challenging their candidacy.18 ' This result obviously goes
against the shareholder-empowerment movement, undermining the
reasons for implementing an IRV scheme.
D. Reduction of the Effectiveness of Dissent Shareholders
Combining IRV with a short slate of directors may have the
downside of reducing the effect of the challenging shareholders. For
example, if challengers put together a short slate of four directors in an
IRV election, and one of those candidates is much more vocal and
passionate about the challengers' goals, then that director may be less
likely to be elected to the board, as the majority of shareholders may
not be willing to elect such a polarizing figure to the board. Thus, even
if two or three of the other short-slate directors do get elected, that
group may not be as effective as the full short slate of directors that
may have been elected on a traditional short-slate ballot.
178. Id. In this case, although information was provided to the students on how to rank
candidates, no information was given to explain how the winner was to be chosen. Obviously the
confusion could have been lessened with a greater educational emphasis.
179. See J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware's Future
Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 412 (2011) ("[A new
voting system] would also significantly complicate the voting process itself, which would mean that
a greater percentage of shareholder ballots would likely go uncounted as being invalidly filled
out.").
180. Id.
181. See id.
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V. IRV MAY PROVE A VALUABLE ADDITION TO SMALLER
CORPORATIONS WITH INVOLVED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE
SHAREHOLDERS, BUT IRV WOULD PROVE INEFFECTIVE
FOR LARGE CORPORATIONS
As seen in Part IV, IRV may increase shareholder empowerment
and lead to a more effective and involved shareholder base. However,
IRV would likely be too costly, confusing, and administratively complex
for large corporations. Given that the city of San Francisco could not
handle ballots containing more than three candidates, it is probable
that a large corporation would not be able to handle a full director IRV
ballot with its large number of shareholders.1 82 Moreover, shareholders
may be too confused to properly fill out their ballots, as many
shareholder voters likely have less of an incentive to learn the IRV
system than citizens using IRV in their political elections, and those
citizens have proven that they often find IRV too confusing even after
years of using the system.183 Moreover, in large corporations, the
likelihood of nonmonotonic results is likely high when there are proxy
contests with highly competitive elections with a large number of
director candidates. 184 Thus, large corporations should most likely not
attempt to implement an IRV system for their corporate elections.185
However, IRV could be an effective tool in smaller corporations
that value shareholder rights and minority representation on the board
of directors. A smaller corporation could more easily educate their
shareholders, who likely are more involved in the corporation than
shareholders of large corporations. The costs of running the election
when there are smaller numbers of shareholders may prove small
enough to justify using an IRV system, especially given that IRV would
rid the need for runoff elections in corporations already using a majority
voting scheme. Shareholders would also likely be more familiar with
director nominations and be able to more effectively fill out their
preferential ballots.
VI. CONCLUSION
IRV has picked up momentum in the past two decades, as
proponents have lauded IRV's ability to cut costs, increase minority
182. See supra Section IV.A.
183. See supra Section IV.C.
184. See supra Section IV.B.
185. See CalPERS, supra note 138 (discussing the positives and negatives of implementing an
IRV system and ultimately deciding to keep their traditional voting scheme).
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representation, and more effectively implement voter preference. Given
that shareholder activists have called for IRV to be used in elections,
many corporations are likely to face the question of whether to
implement a nontraditional voting scheme in their corporate elections.
Indeed, some already have considered the question, although no
publically traded company has decided to implement an IRV system.'86
However, given the costs, complexities, confusion, and nonmonotonicity
of IRV, IRV likely is not a suitable voting system for large corporations.
But smaller corporations could implement IRV in an attempt to
increase shareholder primacy and encourage minority representation
on their boards.
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